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THE LACUNA IN NORTH AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES-
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CANADA*
WALTER S. TANopOLSKY**
T HE right to counsel will be considered with respect to two types of proceed-
ings-criminal and administrative. The problem of obtaining counsel in' civil
proceedings will not be discussed because the problem solves itself to a cer-
tain extent,' and to the extent that it does not, the solution is an extensive system
of legal aid. This aspect of the topic will be discussed in reference to legal aid
in criminal matters. The status of the right to counsel in criminal and adminis-
trative proceedings in Canada can be simply summed up: No denial of counsel
will result in an acquittal in a criminal proceeding, nor in the quashing of a
decision by an administrative tribunal which exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, unless a superior court is satisfied that such denial resulted in the lack
of a "fair hearing." Before discussing this proposition in detail, it is necessary to
note the distribution of legislative power with respect to both types of proceed-
ings.
2
DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
The British North America Act-Canada's basic constitutional document-
gives primary jurisdiction in the field of criminal law and procedure to the
federal Parliament. 3 However, the same section of the Act excepts from the
criminal law power "the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction."
Furthermore, section 92 of the BNA Act, in subsections fourteen and fifteen,
gives the provinces limited jurisdiction in criminal matters:
14. The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Con-
stitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts,
both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Proce-
dure in Civil Matters in those Courts.
15. The imposition of punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Imprisonment
for enforcing any Law of the Province made in relation to any
* This article was completed before the appearance of Professor Brian A. Grosman's
cogent assessment of the inadequacies of the right to counsel in criminal proceedings in
Canada as compared to the United States: The Right to Counsel in Canada, 10 Can. B.J.
189 (1967). There is therefore no discussion of his paper herein.
** Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Canada.
1. In situations where a plaintiff's claim is substantial, and appears to be valid, there
would be no difficulty in obtaining legal assistance. Where it appears to be valid, but not
very substantial in amount, assistance has been provided through a procedure whereby a
plaintiff may get a magistrate to prepare a statement of ciaim and, if necessary, conduct
the case, see, e.g., Small Claims Enforcement Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 102 (1965). From the
point of view of the defendant, where his assets are sufficient to meet the claim against him,
they will be adequate to hire a lawyer, and where this is not the case, few lawyers would
advise suing him, since his lack of assets makes him execution-proof.
2. For a more extensive discussion see W. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights
ch. II (1966). For a discussion of the right to counsel and other legal civil liberties see id.
ch. VII.
3. British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91(27) (1897) [hereinafter referred
to as BNA].
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Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated
in this Section.
The division of legislative jurisdiction under the above-mentioned sections
can be summarized in a series of propositions formulated in several leading cases
by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the United Kingdom which
was, until 1949, the ultimate judicial authority with respect to the BNA Act.
Criminal law is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament.4 Under its
criminal law power Parliament can legislate to prohibit any act or provide that
any omission to act is criminal, and it can enforce such laws with penal conse-
quences. Even though the legislation involved may affect contractual or property
rights, which by section 92 (13) of the BNA Act are essentially within provincial
jurisdiction, 5 it is still valid criminal law legislation. 6 However, since "Property
and Civil Rights" are within provincial jurisdiction, Parliament cannot enact
what has been called "colorable" legislation under the criminal law power for the
purpose of extending its jurisdiction.7 Moreover, even though it is Parliament
that determines criminal law and criminal procedure, because of section 92 (14)
it is the provincial Attorneys-General who decide whether or not to prosecute,
and who have control over the conduct of the prosecution.
In contrast to the United States, the Canadian courts have given a very
restricted definition to the power of Parliament with respect to "The Regulation
of Trade and Commerce"8 while at the same time giving a very extended defini-
tion to the provincial power over "Property and Civil Rights."9 Perhaps the best
illustration of this appears in the field of industrial and labor relations. In 1925,
in the case of Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider,'0 the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council held that essential jurisdiction with respect to
collective bargaining, trade unions, and industrial disputes was provincial, and
not federal. Subsequently the Judicial Committee held that provincial power
in this field extended to such matters as regulation of wages, and hours of work
and rest.1 The federal Parliament does have limited jurisdiction in industrial
relations under its powers over such classes of subjects as "Navigation and
4. Att'y-Gen. of Ont. v. Hamilton St. Ry., [19031 A.C. 524.
5. Citizens Ins. Co. v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 96 (1881) ; Matter of the Board of Com-
merce Act, [1922] 1 A.C. 191.
6. Proprietory Articles Trade Ass'n v. Att'y-Gen. of Can., [1931] A.C. 310, [19311
2 D.L.R. 1, [19311 1 W.W.R. 552.
7. Matter of the Board of Commerce Act, [19221 1 A.C. 191, 60 D.L.R. 513; Att'y-
Gen. of Ont. v. Reciprocal Insurers, [1924) A.C. 328, [19241 1 D.L.R. 789; Att'y-Gen. of
B.C. v. Att'y-Gen. of Can. (Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act case), [1937] A.C. 391,
[19371 1 D.L.R. 695, [19371 1 W.W.R. 320 (P.C.), aff'g [1936] Can. S. Ct. 384, [19361
3 D.L.R. 610
8. BNA § 92(2). See generally, A. Smith, The Commerce Power in Canada and the
United States chs. 6, 13 (1963); see also B. Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law ch. 7,
316-19 (3d ed. 1966).
9. BNA § 92(13).
10. [19251 A.C. 396, [19251 2 D.L.R. 5, [1925) 2 W.W.R. 785 (Ont.).
11. Att'y-Gen. of Can. v. Att'y-Gen. of Ont. (Labor Conventions Case), [1937) A.C.
326.
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Shipping, 12 and over such works and undertakings as communication and
transportation lines extending beyond the limits of one province, or such works
and undertakings as are declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the
general advantage of Canada or two or more of the provinces,1 3 and with respect
to such activities as aeronautics and radio-broadcasting, under the general power
to make laws for the "Peace, Order and Good Government of Canada,"'14 i.e.,
Parliament's residual power.15
This is not intended to be a complete survey of the topic; it is intended
merely to point out that because of the extended interpretation given to "Prop-
erty and Civil Rights,"' 6 and because of provincial power with respect to
"Local Works and Undertakings,"' 7 licensing,18 and "Generally all Matters of
a merely local or private Nature in the Province,"' 9 it is the provinces which
regulate such things as licensing, securities, commercial transactions, industrial
relations, sale of goods and of lands, the use of highways, vehicles, and transport
within the province. If any activities in these myriad fields are to be regulated
by administrative tribunals, or through judicial procedures in the courts, such
activities will be within the legislative competence of the provinces.
Thus, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, it is Parliament which
will determine whether there is to be a right to counsel, unless the criminal or
quasi-criminal proceeding is concerned with an offense enacted under the pro-
vincial power in section 92(15) of the BNA Act. As far as administrative pro-
ceedings are concerned, the right to counsel before a board, tribunal, commission
or other authority will be determined by the legislature which delegated its
power to the administrative body concerned.
It is important to bear the preceding facts in mind when one considers the
effect of the Canadian Bill of Rights on civil liberties in Canada. Section 91 (1)
of the BNA Act, moreover, restricts the amending power of Parliament so as
not to extend to "matters coming within the classes of subjects by this Act as-
signed exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces, or as regards rights or
privileges by this or any other Constitutional Act granted or secured to the
Legislature or the Government of a province." Therefore, the Canadian Bill of
Rights, enacted in 1960 by the Parliament of Canada, applies only to matters
coming within federal jurisdiction. This is recognized in the preamble to the Bill
of Rights, and in section 5(3) of the Bill of Rights:
The provisions of Part I shall be construed as extending only to
12. BNA § 91(10).
13. Id. § 92(10).
14. Id. § 91 (opening paragraph).
15. See also Matter of the Validity of Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation
Act (Can.), (19551 Can. S. Ct. 529, 3 D.L.R. 721.
16. BNA § 92(13).
17. Id. § 92(10).
18. Id. § 92(9).
19. Id. § 92(16).
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matters coming within the legislative authority of the Parliament of
Canada.
20
It should be noted further that the BNA Act does not contain a Bill of
Rights. There are some sections for the protection of certain minority rights,
e.g., section 133 protects the use of the English and French languages, while
section 93 protects the right to separate (denominational) schools, but neither
section extends uniformly to all the provinces. On a few occasions some judges
of the Supreme Court of Canada have applied certain restrictions on the powers
of provincial legislatures. This was justified partly on the implication of certain
sections of the BNA Act and partly on the basis that, since the preamble to
the Act stated the desire of the uniting provinces to be united "with a Con-
stitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom," this involved
protection for certain civil liberties.21 Apart from this, however, the attitude of
the courts has been that they are not concerned with the wisdom or desirability
of legislation, but merely with the question of legislative jurisdiction as set out
under the BNA Act.
22
In sum, the Canadian Bill of Rights affects only the legislative authority
of Parliament. It is the only substantial constitutional (although some would
say statutory) limitation on the right of Parliament to do away with any right
to counsel with respect to proceedings within its legislative competence. There
is no equivalent limitation on provincial competence.
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The Canadian Criminal Code2 3 clearly recognizes that an accused person
has a right to retain counsel to defend him. At the same time, the Code just as
clearly contemplates that an accused may defend himself personally, regardless
of the gravity of the offence. The pertinent sections are the following:
2 4
§ 557. (3) An accused is entitled, after the close of the case for the
prosecution, to make full answer and defence personally or by counsel.
§ 558. (2) Counsel for the accused or the accused, where he is not
defended by counsel, is entitled, if he thinks fit, to open the case for
the defence, and after the conclusion of that opening to examine such
20. The Canadian Bill of Rights is part I of An Act for the Recognition and Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [1960] Can. Stat. c. 44 [hereinafter cited
Bill of Rights].
21. See, e.g., Matter of Alberta Stats. (Alberta Press Bill Case) [1938] Can. S. Ct.
100, 133-34, 146, [19381 2 D.L.R. 81-82; Saumur v. City of Quebec [1953] 2 Can. S. Ct.
299, 330, 359, 371-75, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 641, 671, 699, 711-715; Switzman v. Elbling [1957]
Can. S. Ct. 285, 306-7, 328, 7 D.L.R.2d 337, 357-59, 371-72.
22. See, e.g., Att'y-Gen. of Can. v. Att'y-Gen. of Ont., Que., & N.S. (Fisheries Case),
[18981 A.C. 700, 713 (per Lord Herschell); Union Colliery of B.C. v. Bryden [1899] A.C.
580, 585 (per Lord Watson).
23. The Criminal Code was first enacted in 1892. The most recent revision of the Code
was in 1954, [1953-541 Can. Stat. c. 51 (1954), and it came into force on April 1, 1955,
after a further amendment [1955] Can. Stat. c. 2. There have, of course, been amendments
to the Code since 1955.
24. [Emphasis added.]
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witnesses as he thinks fit, and when all the evidence is concluded to
sum up the evidence.
§ 709. (1) The prosecutor is entitled personally to conduct his case,
and the defendant is entitled to make his full answer and defence.
(2) The prosecutor or defendant, as the case may be, may
examine and cross-examine witnesses personally or by counsel or agent.
The effect of these provisions can be illustrated by a number of recent cases.
In Regina v. Talbot 25 the accused was charged, under section 231(2) of
the Criminal Code, with assault occasioning bodily harm. He was arrested,
pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail on a Tuesday. The trial was set
for that Friday. The accused saw his lawyer on Thursday. At the trial, the
lawyer asked for an adjournment because he had been consulted only on the
previous day; this request was refused, and the lawyer withdrew from the case.
The trial proceeded, and the accused requested that he be defended by a lawyer,
but this was also refused. He was convicted. An appeal to the Quebec Court of
Appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered because of the refusal to adjourn
and the refusal to allow the accused to be defended by a lawyer. The essence of
the unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal may be found in the following
words of Mr. Justice Owen:
2 6
As far as I know our Courts have not yet gone as far as to hold that
the fact that the accused was not represented by an attorney, for
reasons other than his own choice, means per se that he has not had
the opportunity to make a full answer and defence. However, in the
present case it appears to me that if the offence of which the appellant
was charged was serious enough to warrant a sentence of six months'
imprisonment, it was serious enough to warrant that he be allowed the
opportunity of being defended by a lawyer if he so wished.
In Regina v. Huebichwerlen27 the Yukon Court of Appeal2 8 reversed a
conviction for having sexual intercourse with a girl of fourteen (not the accused's
wife) contrary to section 138(1) of the Criminal Code. The accused was not
represented by counsel at his trial before a judge and jury. The court based its
reversal on several grounds, viz., insufficient direction to the jury, insufficient
analysis of the testimony of the accused, and finally, failure to protect the
accused when he was not represented by counsel. On the latter point the court
stated the following:
Having regard to the fact that the accused was not defended by counsel,
and particularly that he appears from the transcript to have had so
little capacity to protect himself "there was cast upon the presiding
25. [1966] 3 Can. Crim. Cas. (ns.) 28 (Que. Q.B.).
26. Id. at 31.
27. 50 W.W.R. (n.s.) 565 (Yuk. Terr. 1964).
28. A Court of Appeal for the Yukon was established in 1960 [19601 by Can. Stat.,
c. 24 § 9. It consists of the Chief Justice of British Columbia, the judges of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal, and the judges of the Territorial Courts of the Yukon and
Northwest Territories. In the Huebschwerlen case the court consisted of the Chief Justice
of British Columbia, another member of his court and a judge of the Territorial Court.
149
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judge the added duty of protecting the interest of the accused to the
end that he should be assured of a fair trial."...29
In an earlier decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the duty of
a court in trying an accused not represented by counsel was stated even more
strongly:
In such circumstances there was cast upon the learned judge presiding
the added duty of protecting in every reasonable way the interest of the
accused to the end that he should be assured a fair trial, the ancient
theory of our jurisprudence being that the court in such circumstances
shall be vigilant to protect the interests of the accused and in effect to
act as counsel for him.
30
And yet, it should be pointed out that the acid test is always this: Did the
accused have a fair hearing? It is not: Is the accused to be acquitted because
he did not have counsel? In other words, even though emphasis is placed upon
the duty of the presiding judge to protect the interests of the accused, if the
superior court feels that the accused was able "to make his full answer and
defence" under Criminal Code sections 709(1) and 557 (3), then the decision
of the lower court will not be reversed.
31
Section 709(2) of the Criminal Code underlines as part of the right to
make "full answer and defence," the right of the accused or his counsel to
examine and cross-examine witnesses. This can perhaps best be summed up in
the headnote to the recent decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Regina
v. Ignat:
Counsel for an accused in a criminal case, no less than for the crown,
must be allowed the widest latitude in the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses subject to the limitations imposed by the
rules of evidence and of fair advocacy. And serious curtailment of this
right by the court, and any suggestion of partiality on the part of the
court, may result in a conviction being quashed .... 32
In Regina v. Ignat the decision was quashed because, in the opinion of the
court, the trial judge had unreasonably interrupted and restrained counsel for
the accused in his cross-examination of crown witnesses.
From Criminal Code sections 557(3), 558(2), and 709, as well as the
cases discussed above it will be readily apparent that a right to counsel in
criminal proceedings exists in Canada only to the extent that a denial of such
right to an accused who wants to be represented by counsel, if such denial
prevents him from making "his full answer and defence," will lead to his
acquittal. The result of a denial of access to counsel at an earlier stage will be
29. Regina v. Huebschwerlen, 50 W.W.R. (n.s.) 565 (Yuk. Terr. 1964).
30. Rex v. Darlyn (1947] 1 W.W.R. 449, 457, 88 Can. Crim. Cas. 269, 277. Rex v.
De Bartoli [1927] 2 W.W.R. 300 (B.C.), af'd, [1927] Can. S. Ct. 454, [1927] 3 D.L.R. 193.
31. Id.
32. 53 W.W.R. (n.s.) 248 (1965).
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discussed after considering the effect of the Canadian Bill of Rights on the right
to counsel in Canada.
The pertinent parts of the Bill of Rights are:
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have
existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason
of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human
rights and fundamental freedoms, namely,
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the
person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be
deprived thereof except by due process of law;
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the
protection of the law....
2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act
of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the
Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate,
abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or in-
fringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and
declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or
applied so as to
(c) deprive a person who has been arrested or detained (ii) of
the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay;
(d) authorize a court, tribunal, commission, board or other
authority to compel a person to give evidence if he is denied
counsel, protection against self incrimination or other con-
stitutional safeguards;
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice for the determina-
tion of his rights and obligations.
It should be stated at the outset that the discussion here of the "due
process" clause in section 1 (a), and the right "to equality before the law" clause
in section 1 (b), will be brief. This is because the courts have emasculated the
potential of these clauses to establish in Canada a right to be provided with
counsel in case of indigence as has been done in the United States in Gideon v.
Wainwright,33 or a right to other forms of financial assistance in the preparation
of a litigant's case as in Griffin v. Illinois,34 or any of the other important legal
safeguards that the United States Supreme Court has developed out of the "due
process" clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, such as a protection against
unreasonable searches,35 or protection for an accused from being a witness
against himself,30 or privilege against self-incrimination in in-custody inter-
rogation.
37
The Supreme Court of Canada has deprived the "due process" clause of
such dramatic possibilities by its decision in Robertson and Rosetanni v. The
33. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
34. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
35. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
36. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948).
37. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
151
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Queen 3 8 In this case the accused were charged and convicted under the Lord's
Day Act39 for carrying on their ordinary calling, i.e., operating a bowling alley,
on a Sunday. The defense was that section 1 of the Canadian Bill of Rights had
repealed the Lord's Day Act. However, on behalf of the majority, Ritchie, J.,
stated:
[T]he Canadian Bill of Rights is not concerned with "human rights
and fundamental freedoms" in any abstract sense, but rather with such
"rights and freedoms" as they existed in Canada immediately before
the statute was enacted. 40
In other words, since section 1 says that the human rights and fundamental
freedoms therein recognized and declared are those which "have existed and
shall continue to exist," this means that the civil liberties therein protected are
those which existed on August 10th, 1960, when the Bill of Rights came into
force. Since at that time there was in Canada no right to be provided with
counsel in case of indigence, and since, as will be seen subsequently, an indi-
vidual who is testifying can be compelled to be a witness against himself, and
since evidence even if illegally obtained in an illegal search may be admissible,
the "due process" clause, and the clause declaring "the right of the individual
to equality before the law and the protection of the law," will not directly affect
the right to counsel or many other rights deemed essential to a fair trial in the
United States.
In two cases the Supreme Court of Canada has had an opportunity to
define "due process" of law, but has declined to do so. In Rebrin v. Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration,41 and in Louie Yuet Sun v. The Queen'2 the
Supreme Court considered allegations that the deportation orders made against
the respective appellants were contrary to due process of law. In the Rebrin case
Kerwin, C.J.C., stated on behalf of the whole court, "There was no infringement
as the appellant has not been deprived of her liberty except by due process of
law." 43 In the Yuet Sun case he again stated that the applicant "has not been
deprived of her liberty except by due process of law."4'
Another reason why the due process clause in the Canadian Bill of Rights
will probably not be an important factor in establishing as extensive a right to
counsel as in the United States is that section 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights
deals specifically with this right.
Before discussing the cases that have considered the right to counsel under
the Canadian Bill of Rights, a few points should be noted about the wording of
the opening paragraph of section 2 and subsections (c) (ii) and (d). The opening
38. [1963] Can. S. Ct. 651.
39. Lord's Day Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 171 (1952).
40. Id.
41. [1961] Can. S. Ct. 376, 27 D.L.R.2d 622.
42. [1961] Can. S. Ct. 70, 26 D.L.R.2d 63.
43. Rebrin v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [1961] Can. S. Ct. 376, 381, 27
D.L.R.2d 622, 626.
44. Louie Yuet Sun v. The Queen, [1961] Can. S. Ct. 70, 72, 26 D.L.R.2d 63, 65.
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paragraph of section 2 states that "no law of Canada shall be construed and
applied so as to" deprive a person of certain rights. It is not at all clear whether
the courts are to declare invalid any proceedings or any preliminary steps to
criminal proceedings when the right to counsel is denied. To date the Supreme
Court of Canada has not declared any statute invalid because it is contrary to
the Bill of Rights. Nor has the Supreme Court reversed a decision of a lower
court on the ground that some preliminary step to a criminal proceeding has
infringed a civil liberty declared by the Bill of Rights. Furthermord, subsection
(c) (ii) refers to a right to retain counsel without delay. Unlike amendment VI
of the United States Constitution, it does not state that "in all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
It would be difficult to construe the wording in the Canadian Bill of Rights to
mean that an accused has the right to be provided with counsel in case of his
indigence. Moreover, the reference in subsection (c) (ii) is to a right to retain
and instruct counsel. Can this be interpreted to include a right to have counsel
present during a police interrogation? Not likely. Subsection (d) merely states
that a person cannot be denied counsel if he is compelled to give evidence. Thus,
an individual who is not compelled to testify would not, seemingly, be covered
by subsection (d).
A further point with respect to section 2(d) that should be noted is that
the reference therein to "protection against self crimination" does not introduce
into the Canadian Bill of Rights the equivalent protection to that available in
the United States under the Fifth Amendment. This is because section 5 of the
Canada Evidence Act provides:
(1) No witness shall be excused from answering any question upon the
ground that the answer to such question may tend to incriminate him,
or may tend to establish his liability to a civil proceeding at the in-
stance of the Crown or of any person.
(2) Where with respect to any question a witness objects to answer
upon the ground that his answer may tend to incriminate him, or may
tend to establish his liability to a civil proceeding at the instance of the
Crown or of any person, and if but for this Act, or the Act of any pro-
vincial legislature, the witness would therefore have been excused from
answering such question, then although the witness is by reason of this
Act, or by reason of such provincial Act, compelled to answer, the
answer so given shall not be used or receivable in evidence against him
in any criminal trial, or other criminal proceeding against him there-
after taking place, other than a prosecution for perjury in the giving of
such evidence.
45
Thus, once a witness has taken the stand, whether or not he is the accused in
that proceeding, he is compelled to answer any question put to him, even if it
does tend to incriminate him in that proceeding. The only protection provided
is that any evidence he submits may not subsequently be used against him in a
45. Can. Rev. Stat. c. 307 (1952).
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later criminal proceeding. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court of Canada will
change the effect of section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act because of section
2 (d) of the Bill of Rights.
Recently there have been three important decisions on the status of the
right to counsel under the Canadian Bill of Rights. The first is the decision
of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Regina v. Steeves.40 The accused, who
was involved in an automobile accident, requested his counsel to accompany
him to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Hearquarters to make out an
accident report as required by the province's Motor Vehicle Act.47 After some
information had been submitted, a sergeant started to ask some questions.
Counsel advised not answering them. Thereupon the sergeant placed the accused
under arrest on a charge of failing to stop at the scene of an accident, contrary
to section 221(2) of the Criminal Code. He asked the accused to come behind
the desk for further questioning, but barred counsel from following his client,
the accused. Counsel telephoned about an hour later regarding bail, and then
came to the R.C.M.P. Headquarters about two hours later. Despite repeated
requests and a citing of the Bill of Rights, he was refused access to the accused.
At trial counsel for the accused argued that due to the denial to the accused of
access to his counsel the accused could not make his full answer and defense as
provided for by section 709 of the Criminal Code. The magistrate dismissed the
charge on the ground that the Bill of Rights applied and that the accused had
been denied a fair trial. The Crown appealed by way of stated case. There were
in essence two matters to consider: (1) should the denial of counsel in itself have
resulted in an acquittal; and (2) should the denial of counsel have led to the
exclusion of any evidence obtained from the accused when his counsel was not
present.
The Nova Scotia appellate court held unanimously that the magistrate was
wrong, and ordered the case to be re-tried on the basis of the evidence submitted
at trial. With respect to the question of whether denial of counsel should of itself
have resulted in an acquittal, Ilsley, C.J., stated:
Nor, in my opinion, is there any general rule that if a person who has
been deprived by the police of the right to instruct counsel without
delay, the charge against that person must be dismissed if he is brought
to trial and the accused go forever free.
Reflection on the consequences of such a rule, if it were to exist in, for
example, the case of capital murder, will indicate, I think, that the
relevant provision of the Canadian Bill of Rights cannot mean that.48
He then went on to deal with the contention that after the accused was denied
counsel he revealed the name of a witness who subsequently testified against
him. Counsel for the accused argued that this was like using an involuntary
confession. However, Ilsley, C.J., rejected this contention and compared this
46. [19641 1 Can. Crim. Cas. (n.s.) 266, 42 D.L.R.2d 335.
47. N.S. Rev. Stat c. 184, § 84 (1954).
48. Regina v. Steeves, [1964] 1 Can. Crim. Cas. (ns.) 266, 268, 42 D.L.R.2d 335, 337.
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instead to the use of a blood test, which is admissible even if taken involun-
tarily.49 Whatever remedies, civil or ciriminal, the accused may have had, he
continued, the right to acquittal or discharge was not one of them.
One member of the court, Coffin, J., dealt more specifically with the con-
tention that the accused had a right to the presence of his counsel during inter-
rogation, and that denial of this right amounted to the denial of a fair trial.
He stated that since the accused was not a compellable witness at the interroga-
tion, the Bill of Rights did not give him a right to counsel. Furthermore, he said,
the events here did not amount to a denial of a fair hearing under section 2 (e) of
the Bill of Rights.
To the extent that counsel for the accused relied on section 709 of the
Criminal Code, the question of section 2(c) (ii) of the Bill of Rights was not
squarely raised. As suggested earlier, the test under section 709 is not whether
the accused is denied access to counsel, but whether he has been able to make
"full answer and defence" at the actual hearing of his case. On the other hand,
it should be pointed out that Coffin, J., seems to have confused the right to
counsel under subsection (d) of section 2 of the Bill of Rights with subsection
(c) (ii). The fact that the accused may not have been a compellable witness at
the police interrogation is a factor to consider under subsection (d), but not
under subsection (c) (ii). The right under the latter is stated to be applicable
without delay when a person is arrested or detained.
A somewhat similar situation to that in Regina v. Steeves50 was considered
by the Supreme Court of Canada in O'Connor v. The Queen.5' The accused,
driving his motor vehicle in Toronto, was stopped by a policeman at about
1:20 A.M., and got out of his car. The police constable observed him and
decided that the accused's driving was impaired. He arrested the accused and
took him to the police station, although the accused did not know he was under
arrest, and was not informed of this until after he had been given two breath-
alizer tests. The accused then requested permission to telephone his lawyer, and
was permitted one call. He failed to contact his lawyer and was denied per-
mission to make a further call to obtain legal assistance. The magistrate con-
victed him on a charge of impaired driving. On an appeal by way of stated
case, Haines, J., reversed, holding that the case should be retried ignoring the
evidence of the breathalizer.52 His judgment was reversed by the Ontario Court
of Appeal.5 3 The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the appeal
from the Ontario Court of Appeal.
Mr. Justice Ritchie, in whose judgment three other members of the five
member court concurred, dismissed the argument that the mere denial of the
accused's "right to retain and instruct counsel without delay" of itself auto-
49. Crim. Code, [1953-54] Can. Stat. c. 51, § 224(3) (1954).
50. [19641 1 Can. Crim. Cas. (ns.) 266, 42 D.L.R.2d 335.
51. [19661 Can. S. Ct. 619, 57 D.L.R.2d 123.
52. [19651 1 Ont. 360, 48 D.L.R.2d 110.
53. [1965] 2 Ont. 773, 52 D.L.R.2d 106.
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matically nullified the subsequent proceedings. He did so by quoting the afore-
cited statement of Ilsley, C.J., in Regina v. Steeves.5 4 As to the second argument,
namely, that the evidence of the breathalizer should be excluded because of the
refusal to allow the accused to make a further telephone call to obtain legal
assistance, he stated:
... [I]n my opinion, the facts submitted in the stated case in no way
suggest that the presence of counsel in the Police Station after the tests
had been completed at 2:15 a.m. could have resulted in his ascertain-
ing any factors which would have affected the admissibility of this
evidence.
If, on the other hand, the breathalizer test evidence was excluded
on the ground that the appellant was deprived of counsel before the
tests were taken by reason of the fact that he was not told of the charge
against him when he was apprehended, then any such ruling must be
based on the assumption that if he had been given this information "he
would there and then have determined upon the obtaining and instruct-
ing of counsel." This is an inference which the learned Magistrate did
not see fit to draw from the evidence and in my opinion no question of
law based upon it arises out of the stated case. 5
He went on to sum up his conclusion in these terms:
The evidence in the present case does not, in my opinion, disclose that
the circumstances under which the police refused "to allow the accused
while under arrest to contact a lawyer" were such as to in any way
deprive him "of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice" and I am accordingly of opinion
that no question arises as to the effect which the Canadian Bill of
Rights might have upon such circumstances if they did exist. 0
The fifth member of the court, Spence, J., agreed with Ritchie, J., but
specifically limited his concurrence to the particular circumstances in this appeal.
He did not feel that there was any basis upon which it could be inferred that the
accused would have been determined to obtain and instruct counsel before taking
the tests had he been informed earlier that he was under arrest. He went on to
say:
There may well be cases where the same failure to warn the accused
that he is under arrest and to state the charge against him results in
the obtaining of evidence which it could not otherwise have been
obtained.5
7
Several comments can be made about the Supreme Court decision. It seems
clear now that contravention by the police of section 2(c) (ii) of the Bill of
Rights will not of itself result in the acquittal of an accused. The Supreme
Court did not have directly before it the status of the right of the accused under
54. See text accompanying supra note 48.
55. [19661 Can. S. Ct. 619, 626-27, 57 D.L.R.2d 123, 129.
56. Id. at 628, 57 D.L.R.2d at 130.
57. Id. 629, 57 D.L.R.2d at 131.
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section 2(c)(i) of the Bill of Rights "to be informed promptly of the reason
for his arrest and detention," and thus, this aspect of the case was not con-
sidered. Finally, the question of the admissibility of evidence obtained from an
accused after he has been specifically refused a request to contact counsel was
also not directly before the court. The Supreme Court specifically held that that
question was not before it, because the evidence was obtained before the request
to contact counsel was made.
It is somewhat doubtful whether the decision on the admissibility of the
breathalizer evidence would have been different in O'Connor v. The Queen,
58
even if the accused had made his request to contact counsel before submitting
to the tests. The reason is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Attorney-General for Quebec v. Bigin.59 The accused had been charged with,
and convicted of, motor-manslaughter. At the trial, evidence of a blood test was
submitted to prove intoxication. It was agreed that the accused consented to
the tests, but that he had not been warned before-hand that the evidence might
be used against him. The essence of the question before the Supreme Court was
whether this illegally obtained evidence was admissible. The Supreme Court
held unanimously that it was. Kerwin, C.J., stated that "even if he had not
been asked and therefore had not consented the evidence would be admissible.
'60
He adopted 6' a statement of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
Kuruma v. The Queen:
... when it is a question of the admission of evidence strictly it is not
whether the method by which it was obtained is tortious but excusable
but whether what has been obtained is relevant to the issue being
tried.6 2
Mr. Justice Fauteux, at somewhat greater length, came to the same conclusion.
He pointed out the distinction between involuntary confessions and involuntary
tests:
.. . [T]he accused's extra judicial confessions, made to persons in
authority, are admissible only when they are voluntary ....
... [T]here has never been ... exclusion, as inadmissible, from the
evidence at the trial, of the report of facts definitely incriminating the
accused and which he supplies involuntarily, as for example:-his
bearing, his walk, his clothing, his manner of speaking, his state of
sobriety or intoxication; his calmness, his nervousness or hesitation,
his marks of identity, his identification when for this purpose he is
lined up with other persons .... Without doubt, the method used for
obtaining this kind of evidence may, in certain cases, be illegal and
may even give occasion for recourse to civil or even criminal action
against those who have used it, but there is no longer any discussion
of the proposition declaring that in such cases the illegality affecting
58. [1966] Can. S. Ct. 619, 57 D.L.R.2d 123.
59. [19551 Can. S. Ct. 593, [19551 5 D.L.R. 394.
60. Id. at 595, [1955] 5 D.L.R. at 396.
61. Id. at 596, [19551 5 D.L.R. at 396-97.
62. [1955] A.C. 197, 204.
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the method of obtaining the evidence does not affect, per se, the ad-
missibility of this evidence at the trial. 3
If denial to an individual, who has been arrested or detained, of his "right
to retain and instruct counsel without delay" does not of itself result in an
acquittal, and if evidence which is illegally obtained is admissible if relevant,
then one must conclude that in Canada there is no right to counsel at in-
custody interrogations, as affirmed in the United States in Escobedo v. Illinois.6'
Obviously, then, the rights of an individual in custody in Canada are nowhere
near those summarized in Miranda v. Arizona:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior
to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights
must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warn-
ings have been given, any such opportunity afforded him, the individual
may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence ob-
tained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.05
What is an individual's right to counsel at trial? As pointed out earlier,
section 2 (d) of the Canadian Bill of Rights refers to such a right, but only to
the extent of declaring an injunction against compelling an individual to give
evidence if he is denied counsel. A recent decision of the Manitoba Court of
Appeal, Regina v. Piper,6 considered the effect of the Bill of Rights where an
accused did not have counsel at his trial. The accused had pleaded guilty before
a magistrate that he bad unlawfully escaped from prison, contrary to section
125 (a) of the Ciriminal Code. He was not represented by counsel, made no
request for counsel, and was not informed that counsel was available through
free legal aid by the Manitoba Law Society. On the appeal, counsel for the
accused referred to such decisions in the United States as Gideon v. Wain-
wright67 and Powell v. Alabama68 in support of his argument that the right to
counsel in a criminal trial is a fundamental right without which a fair trial is
impossible. On behalf of the court, Monnin, J.A., replied:
I informed him [counsel for the accused] from the bench that on
November 2nd, in the case of Regina v. Cull [1965] 3 C.C.C. 123, this
Court, sitting as a full Bench, heard a lengthy argument based on the
same cases, as well as other American decisions, and unanimously with-
out written reasons, has rejected such argument. I am still of the same
63. Att'y-Gen. of Que. v. Bigin, [1955] Can. S. Ct. 593, 601-02, [1955] 5 D.L.R. 394,
402-03.
64. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
65. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
66. 51 D.L.R.2d 534 (1964).
67. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
68. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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view-that what counsel argued before us is not matter for decision by
this tribunal but matter for legislation.6 9
The Court of Appeal did suggest that it would have been preferable for the
magistrate to have informed the accused that he could get free legal aid, "but
failure to do so does not contravene any of the rights under the Bill of Rights."
70
If the Supreme Court of Canada affirms this position, which appears likely, then
the right to counsel at trial is limited to the right of an accused to retain counsel
at his own expense, or to request that he be supplied with counsel, and then to
have his request fulfilled if the administrators of a legal aid scheme, where such
exist, see fit to do so.
LEGAL AID
It is extremely unlikely that in Canada an accused would not be able to get
counsel to represent him at his trial or at a preliminary inquiry, even if he could
not afford to pay such counsel. He would not, usually, get counsel of his choice.
Legal aid in Canada varies from province to province. 71 Only the provinces of
Alberta and Ontario have a government-supported scheme, in both cases ad-
ministered by the Law Society of the respective province. In Alberta, legal aid
under the government-sponsored scheme is limited to criminal matters. In
Ontario the scheme is far more extensive.7 2 It is available in criminal, adminis-
trative, and, with some exceptions, 78 in civil proceedings, both at courts and
tribunals of first instance and at the appellate level all the way to the Supreme
Court of Canada. In Saskatchewan a recent amendment to the Legal Profession
Act makes provision for the Law Society to promulgate rules and by-laws pro-
viding for a plan of legal aid, presumably supported by the government.74 In
the provinces of British Columbia, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and
Newfoundland, there is no government-sponsored scheme, although the local
Law Societies provide their own machinery for legal aid. In some cases, as in
British Columbia and Nova Scotia, these are quite extensive. In no province is
legal aid available in all cases, although Ontario comes closest to this ideal.
ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Before a right to counsel could be asserted in administrative proceedings,
it is necessary first to establish a right to be heard. The most important provision
69. 51 D.L.R.2d 534, 535-36 (1964).
70. Id. at 535.
71. The information contained herein was obtained by the author in a survey of the
Attorneys-General of the provinces. No reply was received from Manitoba and Prince
Edward Island. For a detailed survey up to 1963, see Parker, Legal Aid-The Canadian
Need, 6 Can. BJ. 179 (1963).
72. An Act respecting Legal Aid, [19661 Ont. Stat. c. 80.
73. Defamation, breach of promise of marriage, loss of service of a female in conse-
quence of rape or seduction, alienation of affections or criminal conversation; relator
actions; proceedings for the recovery of a penalty where such are payable to the person
instituting the proceedings; proceedings relating to any election. Id. § 15.
74. [19671 Sask. Stat. bill 75. By the summer of 1967 the Law Society of Saskatchewan
drew up a detailed plan for the operation of the Legal Aid scheme.
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in the Canadian Bill of Rights which could affect the right to be heard in
administrative proceedings is section 2(e). This section declares that a person
should not be deprived of his "right to a fair hearing in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obliga-
tions." In Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence the term "natural justice" has been
used more frequently than the term "fundamental justice," but the terms are
taken as synonymous.75 Two leading English authorities have stated 70 that
English [and Canadian] law recognizes two principles of fundamental or natural
justice: (1) the adjudicator must be disinterested and unbiased, nemo judex
in causa suo, and (2) the parties must be given adequate notice and opportunity
to be heard-audi alteram partem.
In this survey the concern is with the second principle or maxim; i.e., audi
alteran partem. As outlined above, its application would seem to be very wide.
However, this is not so. Not all administrative bodies are bound by this maxim.
At one time one could assert that there was a right to be heard only if an
administrative tribunal exercised a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Thus, in
Local Government Bd. v. Arlidge,77 the English House of Lords held that a
Local Government Board, which held a statutorily required public inquiry and
made a closing order against a house, did not have to give a person who had an
interest in the house an opportunity to be heard. In Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne,78
on an appeal from Ceylon, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held
that a decision to cancel a license was not a judicial or quasi-judicial function,
and the administrative official involved did not have to give notice to the indi-
vidual involved, nor did he have to give him an opportunity to be heard. 79
However, more recently the House of Lords, in Ridge v. Baldwin,"° held that
the audi alteram partem maxim applied to a "watch committee" which dismissed
a Chief Constable and deprived him of his pension rights.
In Canada, one of the leading cases on point is L'Alliance des Professeurs
Catholiques de Montreal v. The Labour Relations Board of Quebec.8' The
appellants had called a strike in contravention of the Public Services Employees
Disputes Act of Quebec. The Board, without notice to the appellants, cancelled
their certificate of representation. The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously
held that the Board was required to give adequate notice and an opportunity
to be heard. Three of the judges described the Board as exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions, but the other two did not. However, two of the three
who did so define the functions of the Board also stated that in these cases the
75. S. A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 102 (1961).
76. Id. at 101; H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law 127 (1961).
77. [1915] A.C. 120.
78. [1951] A.C. 66.
79. For a criticism of this interpretation see H. W. R. Wade, supra, note 62, and Wade,
The Twilight of Natural Justice?, 67 L.Q. Rev. 103 (1951).
80. [19641 A.C. 40.
81. [1953] 2 Can. S. Ct. 140, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 161.
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audi alteram partern rule applied unless explicitly removed by the legislature.82
Two questions still remain: Does the maxim audi alterarn partem apply
only to those administrative tribunals that exercise a judicial or quasi-judicial
function? Or, does the maxim apply to any administrative tribunal which
determines a person's "rights and obligations"? Perhaps the second question in
its terms answers the first. In other words, although a judicial function has been
defined as one where the tribunal is faced with "a suit between parties (lis
inter partes)" in which the tribunal's duty is to decide the issue on the basis
of pre-existing rules,8 3 a quasi-judicial function should not be so restricted and
should be considered to be exercised by any tribunal which is involved in a
determination of a person's "rights and obligations."
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have determined
two other aspects of the application of the maxim audi alteram partem.
In the earlier of these, Guay v. Lafleur,8 4 the court dealt with an inquiry
under the Income Tax Act of Canada. A special inquiry officer held an inquiry
into the affairs of the respondent. He had the power to compel attendance of
witnesses to testify under oath before him in order to enable him to make a
report to the Minister of National Revenue. The report was intended to enable
the Minister to make a decision on the assessment of taxes payable by the tax-
payer whose affairs were investigated. The respondent requested permission of
the inquiry officer to be present at the investigation sessions into his business
affairs and to be represented there by counsel. The request was refused. The
lower court, and the majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal, held that the
audi alteram partem rule applied. However, the Supreme Court, by a majority
of eight to one, held that it did not, and held that the proceeding did not
contravene section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights because "no rights and obligations
are determined by the person appointed to conduct the investigation." 85 The
rule applies only to those tribunals which have the power to give a decision
affecting the rights of, or imposing obligations upon, the persons claiming the
right to be heard.
The sole dissenting judge, Hall, J., described the proceeding in the follow-
ing terms:
Although he was not acting in a judicial capacity or performing a judi-
cial function, Guay was clothed with all the outward attributes of a
judicial body, including the right to subpoena witnesses, to have them
questioned under oath by counsel for the Crown and to compel them to
give evidence as might any Court of record in civil cases. Anyone enter-
ing the room in which the inquiry was begun would have thought him-
self in a judicial hearing or proceeding akin thereto. From this scene
only one person is missing-the man whose affairs are under investiga-
82. Id. at 154 (per Rinfret, C.J.), and id. at 166 (per Fauteux, J.).
83. Labour Rel. Bd. of Sask. v. John East Iron Works, Ltd. [1949] A.C. 134, 149.
84. [19651 Can. S. Ct. 12, 47 D.L.R.2d 226 (1964).
85. Id. at 16, 47 D.L.R.2d at 231.
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tion. The door is barred to him. That, in my view, is a denial of a fair
and impartial hearing to this man.86
He went on to reject the contention that because the inquiry officer did not
make a decision, but merely ap inquiry and report, he did not have to act
judicially. Hall, J., suggested that implicit in the officer's report were his judg-
ments on facts and opinions obtained in the inquiry. Since, on the basis of the
Supreme Court decision in St. John v. Fraser,8 7 the Deputy Minister would have
had to act judicially if he had conducted the inquiry himself, then there was all
the more reason to assert such a requirement with respect to his subordinate.8 8
Although it is difficult to find fault with the reasoning of Mr. Justice Hall, it
must be remembered that his was the dissenting opinion.
In The Queen v. Randolph,8s the court was concerned with an interim
order made by the Postmaster-General, pursuant to the Post Office Act, pro-
hibiting the delivery of mail to the respondent. No prior notice was given. The
Exchequer Court had concluded that this was a judicial function and that the
maxim audi alteram partem applied. However, the Supreme Court unanimously
allowed an appeal from this decision. On behalf of the court, Cartwright, J.,
stated:
Generally speaking the maxim audi alteram partemn has reference to
the making of decisions affecting the rights of parties which are final
in their nature, and this is true also of s. 2 (e) of the Canadian Bill of
Rights... upon which the respondents relied.90
He went on to say that the Post Office Act did provide for a hearing before final
order, and so the maxim was not abrogated. However he asserted that there was
no doubt "that Parliament has the power to abrogate or modify the application
of the maxim audi alteram partem."91
From the Supreme Court decisions in L'Alliance des Professeurs Catholiques
de Montrial v. The Labour Relations Board of Quebec,0 2 Guay v. Lafleur,9
and The Queen v. Randolph,9 4 several propositions may be deduced: (1) Parlia-
ment, or a provincial legislature, may abrogate the application of the maxim
audi alteram partem; (2) Unless the legislative body concerned does specifically
abrogate this maxim, it applies when an administrative authority exercises a
judicial function. In such case the authority must give adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard to the party whose "rights and obligations" are being
determined. (3) This requirement does not apply to an administrative body
which makes an interim decision, nor to an official who inquires and reports but
86. Id. at 19, 47 D.L.R.2d at 232-33.
87. [19351 Can. S. Ct. 441, [1935] 3 D.L.R. 465.
88. [1965] Can. S. Ct. 12, 20, 47 D.L.R.2d 226, 233 (1964).
89. [1966) Can. S. Ct. 260, 56 D.L.R.2d 283 (1966).
90. Id. at 287.
91. Id.
92. [1953) Can. S. Ct. 140, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 161.
93. [1965] Can. S. Ct. 12, 47 D.L.R.2d 226 (1964).
94. [19661 Can. S. Ct. 260, 56 D.L.R.2d 283.
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does not make the decision which affects the rights and obligations of persons.
Even if a. court should hold that there is a right to be heard, this of itself
does not necessarily mean that the right to be heard is one which could be
exercised through counsel. The terms of section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights refer
only to "the right to a fair hearing." When the Bill of Rights was being studied
by a Special Committee prior to its enactment, the Minister of Justice specifically
pointed out that although the terms meant more than a mere "examination of
one's case," it did not even necessarily contemplate an oral hearing.95
CONCLUSION
The discussion here has been confined almost exclusively to the right to
counsel in those criminal and administrative proceedings which are within the
legislative authority of Parliament. However, in Canada there are no separate
provincial and federal courts administering criminal law. Although administra-
tive bodies may be either federal or provincial, to the extent that they are
subject to judicial review, the same principles are applied. And the Supreme
Court oversees all. Thus, what has been said about the right to counsel in this
survey applies equally to federal and provincial proceedings, except that, as
stated earlier, the Canadian Bill of Rights, if it does ever influence judicial
decision-making in Canada, applies only to proceedings within federal jurisdic-
tion.
One must conclude that there is no absolute right to counsel in Canada.
It is a privilege available only at the sufferance of the legislative bodies and, to
a certain extent, made somewhat meaningful through the co-operation of the
legal profession. One must return to where one started: In Canada denial of
access to counsel will not result in an acquittal in a criminal proceeding, nor
to the quashing of a decision by an administrative tribunal, unless a superior
court is satisfied that such denial resulted in the lack of a "fair hearing." And
with respect to administrative proceedings, the quashing of a decision on the
ground that there was not a "fair hearing" will result only if the administrative
authority concerned exercised a judicial or quasi-judicial function, and the
legislature did not remove the right to be heard.
95. H.C. Special Comm. on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Minutes of
Proceedings and Evidence 685-86 (1960). See also S. A. de Smith, supra note 75, at 110-12.
